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NOTES
REGULATION OF UNSOLICITED
TELEPHONE CALLS: AN ARGUMENT
FOR A LIABILITY RULE
It is a common experience to find oneself talking on the telephone
in either one's home or place of business to an unrequested and unwanted salesperson or contribution seeker. Yet despite the rising incidence' of these unsolicited telephone calls, 2 there is no effective
legislation3 or regulation to prevent the intrusion. Solicitors are generally free to call any person, at any time and in any place 4 to peddle
their goods, services or causes. 5 Since there is no effective way to
screen calls beforehand, 6 unsolicited calls result in great inconvenience
1. There are at least 7 million of these calls made each working day. Foes of "Junk
Calls" Go Into Action, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1978, at 67.
2. The term "unsolicited telephone call" does not have a precise, generally accepted definition. For purposes of this discussion, it should be understood as referring to a business call from an organization with which the recipient has had
minimal, if any, prior dealings. Unless otherwise indicated, the term does not refer to unwelcome personal calls or misdialed calls.
Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1029 (1980).
3. Several states have limited the use of automatic dialing recorded message players.
These are devices which dial numbers in sequence and play a recorded message. See, e.g.,
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2871-2875 (West Supp. 1984). No state, however, has as yet
either limited or banned unsolicited telephone calls made by a human solicitor.
4. Most states, however, have laws against obscene and intentionally annoying calls.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West Supp. 1984). See also Note, Unwanted Telephone
Calls-A Legal Remedy. 1967 UTAH L. REv. 379, 381-95. Also, many states recognize a
civil cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for certain disturbing
calls. See, e.g., Schlussel v. Schlussel, 141 Cal. App. 3d 194, 190 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1983).
5. See Comment, Smile and Dial: Regulating Telephone Sales, 32 FED. COM. L. J. 371
(1980) for a description of the various sorts of companies engaged in unsolicited telephone
calls.
6. Answering machines presently offer only a crude solution, since an owner must
wait to hear the recorded message before deciding whether to answer a call. Unlisted
numbers are also inconvenient because people with whom the callee would like to speak
would be unable to obtain the number. Of course, the future may bring more sophisticated devices able to control or eliminate unwanted calls.
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and nuisance 7 and cause a great expenditure of time and money to society which is not charged to the caller.
This Note argues that people have a right to be free from unsolicited telephone calls and examines two ways in which government could
protect the callee's interest. First, the government could establish a
"property rule," giving the callee an absolute right to prohibit any unsolicited calls from being made to him. Second, a "liability rule" could be
established under which the caller would be allowed to make unsolicited calls, but would be forced to compensate the callee for the infringement of the right to be free from such calls. In general, a property rule
would appear to be the preferable alternative. Given the enormous enforcement costs of such a system, however, a liability rule is preferable.
I.

THE NECESSITY FOR REGULATION OF
UNSOLICITED CALLS

A.

THE NUMBER OF UNSOLICITED CALLS

When the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") decided in 1980 not to regulate unsolicited telephone calls,
one of the major reasons was its belief that it did not have jurisdiction
over intrastate calls 8 and that the number of interstate calls was too low
9
to make any regulation effective and efficient. The Commission determined "that [since] only about three percent of all unsolicited telephone
calls are interstatg regulatory action on our part would very likely only
affect a small portion of all unsolicited calls."' 0 The source of this statistic is not indicated in the opinion. The opinion does, however, mention two statistics concerning the number of unsolicited telephone calls
made nationally. One source determined that approximately seven million unsolicited telephone calls are made each business day,"- while the
other stated the figure at twelve million. 12 Taking the average of these
two figures, it appears that approximately nine and a half million unso7. For several "horror stories" concerning the effects of unsolicited telephone calls,
see S. 2193, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 33, 371-72 (1977).
8. An argument can be made that the FCC's present jurisdiction would permit it to
regulate intrastate unsolicited calls. In North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d
1036 (4th Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC's jurisdiction extends to all
terminal equipment that is connected to the interstate network. Intrastate unsolicited
calls are made over that network. Of course, Congress could expand the FCC's jurisdiction as was proposed in the Telephone Privacy Act. See infra text accompanying notes 3336.
9. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1024 (1980).

10. Id.
11. 77 F.C.C.2d at 1030 (citing M. ROMAN, TELEPHONE MARKETING (1976)).
12. Id. (citing R. STECKEL, PROFITABLE SALES OPERATIONS (1976)).
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licited calls are made every business day. 13 Estimating that each of
these calls takes an average of thirty seconds to answer and respond
to,' 4 roughly 79,160 man-hours are spent each day on unsolicited tele5
phone calls.'
Thus, in terms of the time spent on the phone each day, it can
hardly be said that unsolicited telephone calls are insignificant. However, some may welcome unsolicited telephone calls and buy the products or services offered. Nevertheless, a California survey done by the
Pacific Telephone Company estimated that only .1% of people "like" receiving these calls.16 Assuming that this figure is correct, 17 the nuisance resulting from these calls is enormous.
B.

THE EFFECT OF LOWER LONG DISTANCE RATES

Perhaps a more significant reason for federal regulation of unsolicited telephone calls is the likely increase in the incidence of such calls
resulting from the recent decrease in long distance rates.
In the late 1960's, new developments in microwave and satellite
communications lowered the telephone industry's fixed costs. With
these developments, many economists began to question whether the
telephone industry was still a natural monopoly in the long-distance
service market.' 8 In 1969, the FCC, to promote competition, allowed
MCI to compete directly with AT&T in the long-distance market.' 9 In
1977, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed an FCC ruling
and allowed MCI and other companies to compete directly with AT&T's
long-distance WATS 20 service. 21 It thereafter became apparent to the
13. The Commission dismissed the number of unsolicited telephone calls as insignificant in comparison to the 735 million calls made each day nationally. Id.
14. This figure seems reasonable given the initial time needed to ascertain the identity and business of the caller. This figure also takes into account the time spent getting
past the receptionist to a manager or supervisor. See Comment, supra note 5, 372-73.
15. Assuming the FCC is correct in its estimation that only three percent of all unsolicited calls are interstate, 2,375 man-hours are spent each day on unsolicited interstate
calls.
16. FIELD RESEARCH CORP., THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC'S EXPERIENCE WITH AND ATrI.
TUDE TOWARD UNSOLICITED TELEPHONE CALLS 9 (Mar. 1978).
17. While the FCC report mentions this survey, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1030, it doesn't list any
statistics that reflect how many callees "like" or "dislike" receiving unsolicited calls. The
report does list the number of complaints made to the various telephone companies, id. at
1031, but complaint statistics reflect only those persons who are inclined to report such
annoyances. This figure may be very low in comparison to those who quietly curse to

themselves after hanging up the phone.
18. Note, The Proposed Deregulation of Domestic Common CarrierTelecommunications, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 472 (1981).
19. Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), modification granted, 27
F.C.C.2d 380 (1971).
20. "WATS [wide area telephone service) is a long distance telephone service for non-
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FCC that both Congress 22 and the courts were in favor of a more competitive telephone industry. Consequently, the Commission instituted
its own study of the WATS market structure in order to discover how to
23
encourage a more efficient long-distance telephone industry.
The results of this study and the rule changes stemming from it are
both voluminous and complicated. 2 4 It is clear, however, that these
changes will result in lower long-distance telephone rates to large-volume customers. The FCC's new regulations, often referred to as the
"access charge plan," assign a higher fixed cost to each phone line or
phone line access for long-distance service. This fixed cost was previously included in long-distance rates. Under these regulations, once the
subscriber pays the access charge, average long-distance rates will be
lower. The access charge plan will particularly benefit large-volume
users, since they can spread this fixed cost over a larger quantity of
25
long-distance calls.
FCC officials have estimated that after the seven year access charge
phase-in period, long-distance rates will be thirty to forty percent
lower. 26 Since the access charge plan has been approved, both AT&T
and MCI have announced long-distance rate reductions of ten and a half
percent for regular long-distance calling and six and a half percent for
27
WATS service.
This price reduction will almost certainly bring a substantial increase in the number of unsolicited long-distance calls. 28 This is due to
the fact that a soliciting organization's primary cost is its telephone service.29 Any reduction in this cost is likely to be reflected in an exresidential use [that] offers customers a flat rate for unlimited calls within a specific
area." Note, supra note 18, at 463. A random calling of 15 telephone solicitation companies revealed that all but one uses WATS lines.
21. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 57 F.C.C.2d 271 (1975) (mem.), 60 F.C.C.2d 25
(1976), rev'd sub nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 10 (1978).
22. See S. 2827, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 222(d), 126 CONG. REC. S7022 (daily ed. June 13,
1980) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 222); H.R. 6121, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (1979) (adding 47
U.S.C. § 233). See also H.R. REP. No. 1252, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 79 (1980).
23. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 67 F.C.C.2d 757 (1978).
24. Access Charges: MTS and WATS Market Structure, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,358 (1983)
(codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 69).
25. Id.
26. Block, FCCApproves CrucialAccess Charge Plan,TELEPHONY, Jan. 10, 1983, at 13.
27.

Block, AT&T Files Interstate Rate Changes, TELEPHONY, Oct. 10, 1983, at 14. MCI,

AT&T's major competitor, also announced rate reductions of five percent for long distance this year. Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
28. Charitable organizations will also increase their telephone solicitation efforts as
the cost of phone service falls in order to maximize the amount of money received per
dollar spent.
29. The only other major costs are rent and solicitors' salaries. Most telephone solici-
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panded scope of operation.
II.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION

The first attempt to control unsolicited telephone calls was a suit
brought by a private party against a telephone company. 30 The subscriber complained of numerous unwanted calls. He requested that an
"asterisk" be put in the phone book beside the name and number of
every person who did not wish to receive unsolicited calls and that penalties be established for solicitors who called any of those numbers. 3 '
The California Public Utilities Commission dismissed the complaint,
stating that high costs and enforcement problems would make the "as32
terisk" system undesirable.
In the late 1970's, after great public outcry over the increase in
bothersome unsolicited calls, a bill known as the "Telephone Privacy
Act" was introduced into Congress. 33 However, neither that nor any
other bill 34 regulating unsolicited calls has been passed in either the
House or the Senate.
The Telephone Privacy Act would amend Title II of the Communications Act of 193435 to prohibit unsolicited calls to people who do not
wish to receive them. Under the Act, the telephone companies would
prepare a list of the phone numbers of the people who do not want unsolicited calls and sell that list to the solicitors at cost. A criminal penalty would be imposed upon any solicitor who makes an unsolicited call
to a number on the list. Noncommercial calls would be excluded and
there is a provision for automatic dialer recorded message players
("ADRMP's"). This approach is very similar to the "asterisk" method,
though it may be more convenient for the solicitors since they rarely
36
use telephone books.
In response to public debate and congressional interest in the regutation companies install many phones in one small room and could increase the number
of phones per room if necessary. Also, most solicitors are paid on a commission basis so
that their compensation is dependant on their sales volume. See Comment, supra note 5,
at 372.
30. McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 47 (1965).
31. Id. at 49.
32. Id. at 62.
33. S. 2193, supra note 7.
34. Other bills have concerned the use of automatic dialing recorded message players.
See H.R. 10033, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 27,088 (1977); H.R. 10032, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 37,088 (1977); H.R. 9506, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
33,492 (1977); H.R. 9505, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 33,492 (1977).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1982).
36. Random calling of 15 telephone sales companies (e.g., Dunn and Bradstreet) by
the author revealed that most use commercially prepared cards.
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lation of unsolicited calls, the FCC instituted a study37 to consider
whether it should or could regulate unsolicited calls without legislative
action and to determine the best way to correct the problem.38 Several
thousand comments were filed with the Commission from sources such
as public interest groups, telephone sales organizations, and phone owners.39 In a 1980 opinion, the FCC decided that it would not impose any
40
type of regulation on unsolicited telephone calls.

The Commission, while recognizing a serious invasion of privacy,
determined not to regulate the calls because of constitutional and practical considerations. Any regulation of telephone calls would hamper
the caller's freedom of speech, and since phones are such an important
means of communication in our society, "the ability to speak with
others over the telephone would. . . be entitled [to] substantial protection. '41 The opinion, however, stopped short of saying that all forms of
regulation would be unconstitutional. 42 The Commission also determined that any regulation of unsolicited calls would be too burdensome
43
and expensive to enforce.
These constitutional and practical considerations will be further explored in the remainder of this Note. The Commission's contentions
will be examined in light of present circumstances and discrepant statistical studies in order to decide whether any type of regulation can effectively control unsolicited calls.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Any kind of regulation of unsolicited telephone calls will bring two
constitutionally protected interests into conflict. First, any regulation
restricting the solicitor's ability to speak to others via the telephone
would implicate the First Amendment. On the other hand, allowing solicitors to call at will seems to constitute an invasion of the right to privacy derived from the Bill of Rights. 44 It is clear, as presently
45
interpreted, this right to privacy includes the right to be left alone.
The history of First Amendment adjudication demonstrates that
the right to free speech is not absolutely protected. The Supreme Court
Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 67 F.C.C.2d 1384 (1978).
Id. at 1388.
Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1025 (1980).
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1025.
The Constitutional right to privacy was first recognized and defined in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1885).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
'42.
43.
44.
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has held that time, place and manner restrictions of speech or other
forms of communication do not violate the First Amendment if the regulation furthers an important governmental interest which is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. 46 Furthermore, "commercial
speech" is accorded less protection than other forms of speech. 47 Therefore, since the protection of privacy is an important governmental interest,48 properly tailored regulation of unsolicited commercial telephone
calls would be likely to withstand a constitutional challenge.
Generally, in order to decide which one of these opposing interests
is stronger in a given case, the Court has employed a balancing test. In
Rowan v. United States Post Office,49 the Supreme Court considered a
situation analogous to regulation of unsolicited telephone calls. In
Rowan, section 4009 of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of
196750 was challenged as being in violation of the First Amendment.
Section 4009 provided that where an addressee received mail believed to
be sexually provocative, the individual could prevent the advertisement
from being sent to his address by complaining to the Postmaster General. The Court, while recognizing a First Amendment right, upheld
the statute against the constitutional challenge.
The use of judicial balancing in these cases is clearly demonstrated
by the Court's statement that "[in] weighing the highly important right
to communicate . . . against the very basic right to be free from sights
[and] sounds . . . it seems to us that a mailer's right to communicate

must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee." 5 1 In defining the
privacy interest, the Court stressed that "in today's complex society we
are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient
measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit every house'52
holder [the right] to exercise control over unwanted mail.
Rowan, therefore, establishes the basic right of an individual to de46. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967).
47. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servs. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72
(1976). See also Comment, Unsolicited Commercial Telephone Calls and the First Amend-

ment: A Constitutional Hangup, 11 PAC. L. J. 143 (1979). For the new test regarding the
constitutional protection afforded commercial speech, see infra text accompanying notes
60-65.
48.
highest
49.
50.
Pub. L.
51.
52.

"The State's interest in protecting the ... privacy of the home is certainly of the
order in a free and civilized society." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1979).
397 U.S. 728 (1977).
Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 4009, 81 Stat. 613, 645, repealed by Postal Reorganization Act,
No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970).
397 U.S. at 736.
Id.
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cide from whom he or she wishes to receive mail in the home. There
are, however, several differences between regulating unsolicited telephone calls and preventing unwanted mail from reaching one's mailbox.
First, the privacy infringement is more substantial when receiving
an unwanted telephone call. An individual can quickly disregard any
unwanted pamphlet or brochure. A telephone, however, must be answered when it rings, since there is presently no effective way to screen
calls before picking up the receiver. 53 Once the callee has been interrupted, he must spend time ascertaining the identity of the caller and
listening to the "pitch." The callee can hang up, but many people find it
distasteful to be rude and will spend more time on the phone than they
care to. Thus, considering the amount of time spent and the nature of
the interruption, unsolicited telephone calls are more of a nuisance or
invasion of privacy than unwanted mail.
Second, section 4 00954 allowed the addressee to request that no
more mail be sent from a particular sender from whom mail has already been received. Any effective regulation of unsolicited telephone
calls, however, would allow a callee to prohibit these calls before being
This distinction might preclude
contacted by a specific solicitor.
Rowan's applicability to telephone solicitation.
Finally, the Supreme Court, analyzing the privacy issue in Rowan,
emphasized the fact that mail is entering someone's dwelling place, as
opposed to reading a pamphlet on the street or receiving an unwanted
message from a billboard while riding in a train or car. The Court has
not yet addressed the issue of whether a place of business deserves as
much privacy as a private home when it comes to delivered mail, but
any less stringent standard may tip the balance in favor of the freedom
55
of speech.
In Breard v. City of Alexandria,56 another situation analogous to
unsolicited telephone calls, a ban on door-to-door solicitation was chalIn deciding this case, the
lenged on First Amendment grounds.
Supreme Court employed a balancing test similar to that used in
Rowan, stating that "the constitutionality of Alexandria's ordinance
turns upon a balancing of the conveniences between a household's de57
sire for privacy and the publisher's right to distribute publications."
The Court upheld the ban and reiterated that the First Amendment
right is not absolute by its statement that "freedom of speech does not
mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one
53. See supra note 6.
54. 81 Stat. at 645.
55. Section 4009, however, did not distinguish between businesses and private homes.
It therefore seems that Congress also intended to protect businesses from unwanted mail.

56. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
57. Id. at 644.
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chooses." 8
The privacy and First Amendment interests involved in door-todoor solicitation are similar to those involved in unsolicited telephone
calls. Both door-to-door and telephone solicitors must be dealt with immediately and the amount of time necessary to get rid of an unwanted
salesman is about the same in both cases. Also, in both cases the salesman is restricted in one manner of advertisement, although he can still
advertise in other ways (e.g., radio, television, or newspapers). Moreover, door-to-door solicitation restrictions came into effect in the 1950's
for the same reason that restrictions of unsolicited telephone calls are
being proposed in this Note. That is, as the Court said in Breard, "doorto-door canvassing has flourished increasingly in recent years with the
ready market furnished by the rapid concentration of housing." 59
The Supreme Court, however, in several recent decisions has modified the balancing test used in Rowan and Breard for those cases in
which commercial speech is involved. Commercial speech was originally granted First Amendment protection in Bigelow v. Virginia,60 but
the constitutional protection accorded such speech was not as extensive
as that for noncommercial speech. 61 Nevertheless, in Bolger v. Young
Drug Products,62 the Court applied a new standard for testing the validity of regulations of commercial speech which may make any complete
ban of unsolicited phone calls unconstitutional.
In Bolger, the Court struck down 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e) which, along
with 18 U.S.C. § 1461, made it a crime to mail "any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception." 63 After determining that Young Product's message
was commercial speech (promoting the benefits of condoms), the Court
58. Id. at 642. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), the Court struck
down an ordinance that prohibited the door-to-door distribution of circulars. The Court
thought that the government did not have a right to prevent speakers from reaching willing listeners. The Court also noted, however, that a regulation making it unlawful to ring
the doorbell of a householder who had indicated that he or she did not want to be disturbed would be constitutional. Id. at 148. This case can be distinguished from Breard,
however, on the grounds that it involved noncommercial solicitation (religious leaflets).

In Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933), the court upheld an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation that was challenged on due process and equal
protection grounds. For a discussion of the new constitutional protection afforded commercial speech, see infra text accompanying notes 60-65.
59. 341 U.S. at 626.
60. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertisements concerning legal abortions paid for by profitmaking organization).
61. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979). In this
case the Court allowed Texas to prohibit optometrists from practicing under trade names.
62. 103 S.Ct. 2875 (1983).
63. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982).
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applied the four part CentralHudson test. 64 The first part of the test is
to determine whether "the expression is constitutionally protected."
The second part questions "whether the governmental interest is substantial." If these inquiries yield positive responses, then the court
must determine whether "the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted [and whether the regulation] .
65

.

. is more ex-

tensive than necessary."
In Bolger, the speech was held to be constitutionally protected because it was neither unlawful nor misleading, and concerned a matter of
social interest. 66 As to the question of the substantiality of the government's interest, the government asserted that it had a duty to protect
people from receiving materials which they might find offensive and
that there was a governmental interest in aiding parents in discussing
birth control with their children. 6 7 While the Court recognized a governmental interest in protecting people (especially children) from view68
ing certain material, it decided that this statute was too extensive.
The Court noted that the Postal Act upheld in Rowan already allows
people to protect their mailbox. Further, the First Amendment does
not permit the government to prohibit speech unless the captive audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech in any other manner. 69 In
regard to the asserted interest in protecting children, the Court stated
that a ban on unsolicited advertisements would only marginally help
prevent children from learning about contraceptives and that a "restric'70
tion of this scope is more extensive than the Constitution permits.
This Central Hudson test may appear different from the one espoused in Rowan and Breard, but it is essentially a balancing of free
speech against the interest that the government is trying to promote.
The last part of the Central Hudson test, however, appears to be a
version of the least restrictive alternative test. It looks at whether another regulation could promote the governmental interest in a way less
burdensome to free speech. The least restrictive alternative test is frequently used by the Supreme Court in deciding freedom of speech issues. 71 The test requires the government to tailor its regulations so that
they reach their legitimate ends with the least infringement on per64. 103 S. Ct. at 2881. The test was first stated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
65. 103 S. Ct. at 2881.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2883.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2884.
71. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (2d ed. 1983).
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sonal liberties. In applying the test in Shelton v. Tucker, 72 the Court
said, "the breadth of legislative abridgment [of personal liberties] must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means of achieving the same basic
73
purpose."
Any challenge to a complete ban on unsolicited telephone calls
could assert that the government is infringing on the right of people to
speak via the phone to others who wish to listen. The government
could control unwanted calls through other less restrictive means, such
as making a list of the numbers not to call available to the solicitors. A
reply that the ban is the cheapest and most efficient- way to reach the
legitimate end of preventing bothersome calls might be rejected by the
Court as quickly as it rejected the states' efficiency arguments in the
74
dormant commerce clause cases.
In conclusion, a total ban on unsolicited telephone calls, even if limited to those calls amounting to commercial speech, would most likely
face a strong constitutional challenge on First Amendment grounds.
Therefore, any regulation imposed should be limited to giving the callee
a choice as to whether or not to receive the unsolicited calls. This
would bring the regulation under the Rowan analysis and avoid the
problems of the least restrictive alternative test. Thus, the Telephone
Privacy Act, since it allows individual phone owners to decide for themselves whether to receive the calls, is most likely constitutional.
IV.

CALLEE'S ENTITLEMENT

It is useful to look at the controversy over unsolicited telephone
calls as a conflict between two groups. One group is comprised of callers and those persons wishing to receive calls, while the other consists
of unwilling callees. While an individual is not necessarily a member of
just one group, it is helpful for analytical purposes to consider the
groups as distinct with conflicting interests.
Society is often faced with conflicts between two or more competing groups, and the job of any government or legal system faced with
these conflicts has been to resolve them. Calabresi and Melamed look
at these decisions as a two-step process of first determining which group
should be favored-the "setting of entitlement"-and then deciding
how to best protect and defend the entitlement. 75 They use three crite72. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
73. Id. at 488.
74. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1950). A state may not erect
an economic barrier to entry where reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives are available. Id. at 354.
75. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-93 (1972).
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ria for setting the entitlement: efficiency considerations, distributional
goals, and other justice considerations.
In explaining the first criterion, Calabresi and Melamed note:
Economic efficiency means that we choose the set of entitlements
which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not so improve the
condition of those who gained by it that they could76 compensate those
who lost from it and still be better off than before.
For example, if callers are granted the entitlement, an efficient
number of unsolicited calls would be that number made where every
caller would be unwilling to sell his rights to call for the highest price
that every callee would be willing to pay to not be called. If the callees
are granted the entitlement, an efficient number would be that made
where every callee would be willing to sell his right to not be called for
the highest price every caller is willing to pay.
It has been argued that regardless of who is initially granted the
entitlement, economic efficiency will be achieved as long as there is an
adequate market. 77 In order for the market to be adequate, however,
negotiation costs must be low. 78 With respect to unsolicited telephone
calls, negotiation costs are a problem. It would be extremely time consuming and expensive for every potential callee to contact every telephone sales company to either buy or sell the entitlement. A callee
could not know what companies to contact, and even if he could, the
cost of mailing each company an offer to negotiate would be prohibitive.
It would be equally difficult for each caller to contact every potential
callee before making an unsolicited call to negotiate for the entitlement. 79 Thus, at the present time there is no market for the buying or
selling of rights to unsolicited telephone calls.
The lists of unwilling callees which would be created as a result of
the Telephone Privacy Act,8 0 however, would establish a market in
which the parties could negotiate over the entitlement. This market
would operate with relatively minor transaction costs and would promote the goal of efficiency regardless of where the entitlement is
placed. Therefore, although efficiency does not provide an answer to
the question of who is deserving of the entitlement, it does provide the
76. Id. at 1093-94.

77. Coase, The Problems of Social Costs, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
78. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1094-95.
79. It appears to be less costly, however, for the caller to initiate the negotiation. The

caller knows whom he wants to call, while the callee is not likely to know who wants to
call him. Note, however, that the nuisance resulting from a call to negotiate would be
similar to that resulting from any unsolicited call.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
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basis for a very strong argument for the creation of unwilling callee
lists.
The second criterion used for determining where to set the entitlement is that of the proper distribution of wealth.8 1 This criterion, however, seems inappropriate in deciding where to place the entitlement in
the context of unsolicited telephone calls. The major difficulty would
lie in trying to discern the relative wealth of the two competing groups.
Perhaps the criterion most useful in determining where to place
the entitlement in this context is that referred to by Calabresi and Melamed as "other justice reasons."8 2 The authors divide this category
into two elements: worthiness and consistency. Using as their example
the conflict between silence lovers and noise lovers, Calabresi and Melamed state that where efficiency and redistribution goals provide no
clear indication as to who should receive the entitlement, only two reasons are left on which to base the decision. "The first is the relative
worthiness of silence lovers and noise lovers. The second is the consistency of the choice, or its apparent consistency, with other entitlements
'83
in the society.
Both of these concepts are vague and abstract. "The first sounds
appealing, and it sounds like justice. . . . [But] to say that we wish, for
instance, to make the silence lovers relatively wealthier because we prefer silence is no answer, for that is simply a restatement of the question. ' '8 4 Thus, the first reason is simply a moral determination that one
activity is more noble than another. The second reason is appealing because it purports to treat like cases alike:
If the entitlement to make noise in other people's ears for one's pleasure is viewed by society as closely akin to the entitlement to beat people up for one's pleasure, and if good efficiency and distributional
reasons exist for not allowing people to beat up others .... then there
may be a good reason for preferring. . . silence rather than noise. ...
Because the two entitlements are apparently consistent, the entitlement to silence strengthens the entitlement to be free from ... beat85
ings. . . . It does so by lowering . . . enforcement costs ....
In conclusion, neither efficiency nor distribution considerations
seem to give us a reason for giving the entitlement to either callers or
callees. Since this Note has established that to allow solicitors to call at
will would be an invasion of the callee's right to privacy, consistency
and relative worthiness considerations seem to militate in favor of
81. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1098.
82. Id. at 1102.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1102-03.
85. Id. at 1103.
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This Note will continue on that

PROTECTING THE ENTITLEMENT

Once the entitlement has been given to one group, the next step is
to decide how government is going to protect it. Calabresi and Melamed
lay out three different sets of rules that can be used to guard the favored group's interest: property, liability and inalienability.8 6 A property rule protects an entitlement "to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him
in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller." A liability rule protects an entitlement
"whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing
to pay an objectively determined value for it." 8 7

This value may be

more or less than the entitled party would have sold it for. Finally, an
inalienability rule protects an entitlement "to the extent that [the government doesn't permit] its transfer ..
between a willing buyer and a
'88
willing seller.
An inalienability rule is inappropriate in the context of unsolicited
telephone calls. By definition, the group who enjoys the entitlement,
unwilling callees, do not want to talk to callers. But if the callees became willing to talk, either because they were given a fee or simply
changed their minds, there is no reason for government to prevent the
parties from communicating over the phone. Thus, this entitlement
must be protected by either a property or liability rule.
Generally, when there is an adequate market with low negotiation
costs, a property rule provides the most efficient and equitable method
for protecting an entitlement. 89 A property rule is efficient because if
the party granted the entitlement places a higher value upon it than the
unentitled party, the entitled party will retain it; and if the unentitled
party values the right more highly, it will be able to purchase the right
in a voluntary transaction. A property rule is equitable because, unlike
a liability rule, each individual's subjective value for the entitlement is
recognized.
The list system envisioned by the Telephone Privacy Act 90 can be
seen as a rough approximation of such a property rule. As previously
discussed, 91 this system would establish a list of the phone numbers of
86. Id. at 1105-15.

87. Id. at 1092.
88. Id. at 1092-93.

89. Id. at 1124-27.
90. S. 2193, supra note 7.
91. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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unwilling callees which would be distributed at cost to those companies
engaged in telephone solicitation. In addition to protecting the callee's
entitlement, this list would establish a market in which the caller could
negotiate for the right to make unsolicited calls.9 2 In practice, however,
the operation of this list as a market mechanism is problematic. First,
the list would constitute only a rough approximation of callees' preferences, with the callee only being able to decide whether or not he wants
to receive unsolicited calls in general. 93 Secondly, there would most
likely be a serious free rider problem, since those callees who would
otherwise be willing to receive unsolicited calls would be inclined to
place their names on the list in order to receive the fees from the caller.
In addition to these market problems, two additional difficulties exist in connection with the implementation of a list system. The first is
the cost of administering the list, and the second is the cost and adequacy of enforcement. 94 The first problem can be solved by the Telephone Privacy Act under which the phone companies create the lists by
collecting the names of those not desiring unsolicited calls and then
pass the cost onto the callers. The second problem, however, is more
serious. The FCC has indicated that it would be very expensive and
perhaps impossible to prevent callers from calling those on the lists. 95
After discussing the costs of the possible enforcement mechanisms of
the list system, this Note will examine whether, in light of these costs, a
liability rule would be a more desirable means of protecting the callee's
entitlement.
VI. ENFORCEMENT
The greatest difficulty with protecting the callee's entitlement by
means of a list system is the cost of enforcement. As the FCC stated in
referring to the Telephone Privacy Act, "a regulation of this kind would
be difficult to enforce and expensive to implement." 96 The same opinion points out that without drastically changing the present phone system, the callee or telephone company would have no way of knowing by
whom an illegal call was made.97 Presently, most solicitors use false
names and addresses, and this practice will undoubtedly increase if
criminal penalties are imposed for illegal calls. 98 While there are sev92. See supra text accompanying note 80.
93. To allow a callee to decide exactly which companies or organizations he would accept calls from would require numerous lists and would result in prohibitive administrative expense.
94. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1037 (1980).
95. Id. at 1038.
96. Id. at 1037.
97. Id. at 1038.
98. Comment, supra note 5, at 372.
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eral possible methods of enforcement, all have significant drawbacks.
A callee could, of course, agree over the phone to buy the goods and
have them traced back to the solicitor through the mail when they arrived. It is doubtful, however, that many callees would agree to participate, since this procedure would require a great expenditure of time
and effort. The telephone company or FCC could monitor the solicitors'
phone lines in order to determine whether illegal phone calls were being made, but with the number of calls made each day it would be necessary to have a large staff to listen to the calls. 99 The telephone
company could also change its record keeping system so that all the
numbers a solicitor calls would be checked against the forbidden numbers. It seems, however, that the cost of such record keeping would be
extremely high.
Another option would be to have the solicitors themselves pay the
costs of enforcement. In a sense, this seems fair, since the solicitors are
causing the problem. But if these costs are too high, the solicitors could
be driven out of business, though perhaps not to everyone's chagrin.
Once the list of unwilling callees is compiled, one might think that
the solicitors would voluntarily refrain from calling the listed numbers
regardless of the penalties. Since those people have stated that they
don't want unsolicited calls, the chance that they would buy or contribute would appear to be so slight that they are not worth calling. The
trouble is that if only .1% of callees "like" receiving unsolicited calls, 00
the vast majority of phone owners might want to be on the list, which
would substantially curtail the telephone solicitation business. Faced
with this situation, telephone solicitors would have a significant incentive to violate the law by calling those listed, and experience shows that
a sufficient number of these calls would result in sales to make the enterprise profitable. The reasons for the disparity between the low percentage of people who profess to "like" unsolicited calls and the
profitability of these operations are probably psychological.10 ' A
smooth talking salesperson with a rehearsed "pitch" is at an advantage
over an unassuming callee. In addition, however, in the case of calls to
99. For other criticisms of this approach, see id. at 387. Of course, penalties could be
increased to compensate for the low probability of being caught. In general, however,
"the magnitude of the threatened punishment (appears to be] not as important a consideration as the probability of discovery and punishment." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW

23 (1972).

100. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
101. See P. ZIMBARDO & F. RUCH, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 584-85 (1972). The discrepancy between the low number of those receptive to these calls and the apparent profitability of telephone solicitation companies could be attributed to a high profit margin on
each sale and the fact that individuals when responding to a survey are more likely to give
a thoughtful answer than when talking to a salesman with a smooth "pitch." Id.
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businesses whose numbers are on the list, the solicitor might offer personal incentives to a purchasing agent in order to make a sale to the
business. 102
Therefore, at the present time, the cost of enforcing any system
that prohibits solicitors from calling those individuals who have stated
that they don't want to receive the calls seems too great to make such a
system practical.
VII.

PROPERTY OR LIABILITY RULE?

If an entitlement is not adequately protected by one of the three
rules discussed in Section V, an economic externality arises. 10 3 An externality is the cost to one group of losing a right to another without
compensation. This has the effect of increasing the occurrence of the
conflicting group's activity since that group is not required to pay for
10 4
the cost that it imposes on the entitled group.
For example, if society determines that people have a right to clean
air, but the government fails to enforce that right, factories would be
able to pollute without paying compensation for the harm to the environment. Since the factories would not be paying for the pollution they
cause, they would be able to lower the cost of their goods. This would
increase the demand for their goods, causing more to be made and ultimately benefiting the factory owners. Similarly, if a callee's right to be
free from unwanted calls is not protected, more unsolicited calls will be
made. This increase will benefit telephone sales companies and their
customers at the expense of unwilling callees.
The solution to the problem is for government to restructure the
activity that causes the externality so that the cost is paid by those who
enjoy its benefit. 10 5 This can be accomplished by establishing one of the
three rules described in Section V. 10 6 In determining which rule will
most efficiently protect the entitlement, the cost of enforcement must
be taken into account. 0 7 If by using a property rule the cost of preventing others from taking the right exceeds the subjective value that is lost
by using a liability rule, society as a whole can be said to be better off by
102. Comment, supra note 5, at 373.

103. "Externalities are said to arise when the decisions of some economic agents ...
affect the interests of other economic agents in a way not setting up legally recognized
rights of compensation or redress." J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 532
(2d ed. 1980).

104.
105.
106.
107.
where

Id.
Id. at 534-39.
Id. at 535-38. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1105-15.
Calabresi and Melamed take enforcement costs into account in determining
to set an entitlement. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1093. These

costs are important as well with respect to the protection of the entitlement.
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employing a liability rule. x0 8
A liability rule uses an objectively determined value to measure
how much must be paid for the taking of the entitlement. 10 9 Those
people who would not be willing to sell their right for this objective
price would be injured to the extent that their real (subjective) price is
higher than the objective price they are offered. Nevertheless, society
would benefit from using a liability rule if, all things being equal, the
aggregate value of these losses is less than the cost to society of enforcing a property rule.
A liability rule is cheaper to enforce than a property rule. The enforcement of a liability rule would require only that the government
monitor the number of calls being made. The enforcement of a property rule, however, would require that the government determine who
was being called.
There are many instances in which a property rule will be preferred regardless of the price of enforcement. For example, most people would be appalled if someone could rape another and have to pay
only an objectively determined monetary price as the penalty."i 0 It is
doubtful, however, that many would be outraged by the imposition of a
liability rule in the case of unsolicited telephone calls. Answering an
unwanted call would not appear to offend anyone's sense of personhood
or property, but is rather just a nuisance.
In addition to lower enforcement costs, a liability rule has appeal in
terms of the free speech issue. A liability rule would allow parties to
make unsolicited calls, but would force the caller to compensate the callee for the invasion of his privacy. This may in fact be the best balance
between freedom of speech and the right to privacy.
The use of a liability rule in this context would also help to insure
that an efficient number of unsolicited calls is being made. A liability
rule protecting the callee's entitlement would work by increasing the
phone bill of those companies making unsolicited telephone calls and
then distributing the additional funds to callees in the form of lower
phone bills. To implement this cost shifting system, it would be necessary to measure the value in dollars of an unwanted call. Of course,
this value will differ according to the circumstances, but a dollar figure
can be derived which would reflect the cost to the average callee.'1i
108. Id. at 1106.
109. Id. at 1092.
110. Id. at 1124-27.
111. A dollar figure could be calculated from the man-hours spent on these calls. See
supra text accompanying notes 13-15. It might also be possible to establish different cost
tiers, so that, for example, a call to a private residence at 9:00 P.M. would cost more than
a call to a business at 5:00 P.M. The more complicated the system, however, the more
expensive and less desirable it becomes.
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The FCC or states would assess this cost upon each solicitor based on
the number of unsolicited calls he makes.1 12 Each solicitor would then
have to take into account the annoyance cost which was formerly imposed upon unwilling callees. This would result in diminishing the
number of unsolicited calls and ultimately having the people who do
buy goods over the phone pay for the annoyance to others.
There is, however, a problem in determining how to distribute the
funds that are raised by this new charge. Fairness considerations would
dictate that they should go to each callee according to how much he is
injured by unsolicited calls. The only way this option could work would
be if people would honestly indicate the degree to which they are bothered by the unwanted calls. This is unlikely given the incentives to exaggerate their true annoyance. This being the case, it appears that the
only feasible alternative would be to distribute the funds in across-theboard rate decreases.
CONCLUSION
People have a right to be free from unwanted and annoying unsolicited telephone calls. Due to the present number of these calls and
their potential increase in the near future, federal or state governmental action to protect the callee is warranted. The best solution to the
problem would be for each callee to decide whether he wishes to receive
these calls or not. Because of the enormous enforcement cost of that
system, however, a second alternative of forcing callers to pay callees
for their time should be implemented.
Henry C. DarmstadterIII

112. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1037 (1980).

